Documents reveal that Blair urged end to BAE-Saudi corruption investigation

by The Corner House and CAAT

first published 21 December 2007

Documents released in the High Court on Friday 21 December 2007 indicate that the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) investigation into BAE's Saudi arms deals was dropped only after the then Prime Minister Tony Blair sent a personal minute to the Attorney General Lord Goldsmith. They show that Goldsmith did not believe that the case should be dropped in response to alleged Saudi threats to withdraw intelligence and security co-operation.

The documents are a witness statement from the Director of the Serious Fraud Office, Robert Wardle, and nine redacted (words and sentences excluded) typed-up letters between the Prime Minister and/or Cabinet Office (the government department supporting the Prime Minister) and the Attorney General (which superintends the Director of the Serious Fraud Office) dating from December 2005 to December 2006.

The documents were released during a 'Directions Hearing' at the High Court to prepare for a judicial review brought by The Corner House and Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT) against the UK Government's decision to cut short the SFO investigation into alleged corruption by BAE Systems in recent arms deals with Saudi Arabia.

They show that on 8th December 2006, Blair sent Goldmsith a 'personal minute' about the "real and immediate risk of a collapse in UK/Saudi security, intelligence and diplomatic cooperation".

Blair stressed in this 'personal minute' his concern about "the critical difficulty presented to the negotiations over the Typhoon contract", (a further proposed but unsigned deal for the sale of 72 Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft from BAE to Saudi Arabia).

However, on 11th December -- only three days before the investigation was dropped -- Goldsmith told Blair that halting the investigation on the grounds of Saudi claims to withdraw cooperation "would send a bad message about the credibility of the law in this area, and look like giving in to threats".

The released documents -- which are heavily censored -- do not contain any assessment of whether the Saudi threat to withdraw intelligence and diplomatic co-operation was real, credible or even imminent.

The decision made by the Director of the SFO, Robert Wardle, on 14th December 2006 to drop the investigation appears to have been based on Blair's personal minute and meetings with the UK Ambassador to Saudi Arabia.

The government has not released any documents about the Ambassador's representations to Wardle nor about the Saudi representations to the UK government.

"From what we have seen so far, the evidence for any kind of genuine national security threat posed is threadbare", said Nicholas Hildyard of The Corner House. "The government's chief law officer was clearly advising it not to give in to the Saudi threats, but succumbed to pressure from Tony Blair."

The Corner House and CAAT believe that the government has held back many documents. Their lawyers argued today that key information should be released.

The Directions Hearing was adjourned until early January 2008.

To learn more about the legal challenge and the background to it, go to Control BAE.

NOTES

  1. At a Directions Hearing, a judge gives 'directions' to both parties as to how evidence should be presented. CAAT and The Corner House served their evidence as part of their application for a judicial review. The Serious Fraud Office (the defendant in the judicial review) served their evidence to the Court outlining why it had decided to drop the investigation only once permission to bring the judicial review was granted on 9 November 2007.

    Lawyers acting for The Corner House and CAAT argued in court on 21 December 2007 that uncensored versions of the evidence; original rather than typed-up evidence; and further key documents should be released. The Directions Hearing was adjourned to be continued in early January 2008.

    The evidence of both parties will be scrutinised at the judicial review hearing itself, which is scheduled to take place on 14-15 February 2008 before a Divisional Court.

  2. The Serious Fraud Office is a UK government department that investigates and prosecutes complex fraud. The Attorney General superintends the Director of the Serious Fraud Office; both are supposed to act independently of government. The Attorney General is the chief legal adviser to the Government and is responsible for all crown litigation. The Attorney General is appointed by the Prime Minister and is a member of parliament. Under the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, decisions on corruption cases should not be made by political appointees. Decisions should be made only on the merits of the case and not other considerations.
  3.  

  4. Time line of judicial review
    • 14th December 2006: The Serious Fraud Office (SFO) investigation into BAE's arms deals with Saudi Arabia was suspended.
    • 18th December 2006: The Corner House and CAAT wrote to the UK Government arguing that the SFO decision was unlawful and should be reversed.
    • 23rd February 2007: The groups began the judicial review process.
    • 19th April 2007: The groups lodged their full grounds for an application for a judicial review.
    • 29th May 2007: The High Court refused to grant permission for a judicial review hearing on the grounds that "national security must always prevail".
    • 9th November 2007: Lord Justice Moses and Mr Justice Irwin granted permission to bring a full judicial review hearing against the UK Government's decision to cut short the Serious Fraud Office investigation into alleged corruption by BAE Systems in recent arms deals with Saudi Arabia.
  5.  

  6. The basis for the judicial review brought by CAAT and The Corner House hinges on Article 5 of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. The SFO decision was purportedly based on considerations of potential damage to relations with Saudi Arabia, and thus to the UK's national security, if the BAE-Saudi arms deals investigation continued. This is expressly forbidden under Article 5, which rules out the termination of corruption investigations on grounds other than the merits of the case. Signatory governments specifically undertake not to be influenced "by the potential effect [of an investigation] upon relations with another State . . . .".